

REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE EU-CHINA
RELATIONS

ДИПЛОМАТСКА СТРАТЕГИЈА НА КИНА ВО РАМКИТЕ НА КИНА-ЕУ
ОДНОСИТЕ

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Abstract: The Republic of China has lost more and more diplomatic relations with the third countries since 1971, and consequently, the legitimacy of the Republic of China faces critical challenge from the international community. When Republic of the Gambia severs diplomatic relations, a part of citizens from the Republic of China doubt President Ma Ying-jeou's diplomatic strategy that claims the Republic of China (Taiwan) is "One China", Diplomatic Truce (外交休兵), and Viable Diplomacy (活路外交). As a matter of fact, it is true that President Ma Ying-jeou's diplomatic strategy paves a survival way for the Republic of China's diplomatic engagement with the third countries or international organizations, particularly the EU supports the current diplomatic policy operated by the Republic of China.

This paper is designed to study the Republic of China's diplomatic strategy in the EU-China Relations, particularly the EU and China cooperate more and more; this paper uses Realism to be theory base to research What impact and influence of the Republic of China's diplomatic strategy in the EU-China Relations, and employs the Historical Review to study the interaction between the EU, China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the period of President Ma Ying-jeou's diplomatic strategy. This paper concludes that the EU and China agree Diplomatic Truce (外交休兵), and Viable Diplomacy (活路外交), because both approaches do not challenge the EU and China's common position in the term of "One China" which symbolizes the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan)

supports "One China" is interpreted by the EU and China to be a friendly diplomatic strategy to respect the sovereignty and territory of the People's Republic of China.

Keywords: One China Policy, One China Principle, Viable Diplomacy, Diplomatic Truce, the EU-China Relations

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the Republic of China's Diplomacy in the EU-China Relations, and the main research questions are: 1. Diplomacy Truce (Principle) and Viable Diplomacy (Approach), 2. EU and China's reaction toward the Republic of China's Diplomacy in President Ma Ying-jeou's administration. In 2008, Mr. Ma Ying-jeou won a clear mandate (over 58% of the vote) to change the trajectory of Taiwan's external policy by forging better relations with Beijing and seeking its acquiescence for independent foreign policy initiatives. Part of this was a 'diplomatic truce' which Ma hoped would let Taiwan relax its expensive, unseemly and increasingly fruitless efforts to compete with Beijing for recognition. (OxResearch Daily Brief Service, 2013).

President Ma is very proud of diplomatic truce, because this principle makes him better relationships with the People's Republic of China, the United States, and other countries that do expect the People's Republic of China and Republic of China in confrontation. The diplomatic truce is principle, and viable diplomacy is approach. President Ma believes that Republic of China still explores diplomatic survival space, even though diplomatic truce freezes the zero-sum competition against the People's Republic of China in diplomacy.

After literature review, there are several articles related to President Ma's diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, and these papers refer to:

Alexander, C. (2011). Public diplomacy and the diplomatic truce: Taiwan and the people's republic of china (PRC) in El Salvador. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 7(4), 271-288.

Alexander examines Taiwan's diplomatic strategy in the Caribbean basin, and his article concludes that Taiwan diplomatic truce eases diplomatic competition against China, but Taiwan still continues diplomatic engagement in this area with public diplomacy. This article concludes that Taiwan diplomatic truce is incorporated into the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by the PRC and Taiwan. Even though this article analyses Taiwan diplomatic truce, this paper does not analyse the Taiwan diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Tubilewicz, C. (2012). Friends, enemies or frenemies? China-Taiwan discord in the world health organization and its significance. *Pacific Affairs*, 85(4), 701-722.

Tubilewicz analyses Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organisation with diplomatic truce. This article concludes that China agrees Taiwan to enjoy partial right to participate the World Health Organisation, and this paper demonstrates that diplomatic truce is practical to relax China-Taiwan diplomatic tension, and diplomatic truce provides Taiwan's international legal sovereignty to participate more international organisation activities. This paper does not focus on Taiwan diplomatic truce in the EU-China Relations, but this article examines Taiwan's legal sovereignty in the World Health Organisation.

Gilley, B. (2010). Not so dire straits. *Foreign Affairs*, 89(1), 44-56

Gilley's article reviews President Ma's diplomatic strategy, and his paper agrees diplomatic truce to release tension between China and Taiwan. This paper concludes that President Ma's diplomatic truce is a new approach to rebuild confidence between China and Taiwan, and avoid potential military dispute over the Taiwan Strait. In advance, this article has several positive analysis and conclusion in diplomatic truce that reduces hostility between China and Taiwan. This paper analyses diplomatic truce, but this article does not aim diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Tubilewicz, C., & Guilloux, A. (2011). Does size matter? Foreign aid in Taiwan's diplomatic strategy, 2000-8. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 65(3), 322-339.

Tubilewicz and Guilloux review Taiwan's diplomatic strategy 2000-2008, and analyse diplomatic benefit and loss. This article criticises Taiwan's diplomatic strategy 2000-2008 is failure, because Taiwan does not explore more diplomatic space with foreign aid approach. This paper argues that Taiwan did not engage in generous financial aid and proposed that this parsimony, rather than futility of aid diplomacy as a strategy to expand Taiwan's international space, should be considered as contributing to Taipei's diplomatic failures from 2000 to 2008. (Tubilewicz & Guilloux, 2011:). In accordance with Tubilewicz and Guilloux's analysis, their research reviews Taiwan diplomatic strategy but has less discussion about diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Charney, J. I., & Prescott, J. R. V. (2000). Resolving cross-strait relations between china and taiwan. *The American Journal of International Law*, 94(3), 453-477.

Charney reviews the development history of the Cross-Strait Relations from middle-age to modern history, and discusses disputable sovereignty issue between China and Taiwan. In addition, this paper analyses and compares Taiwan and China diplomatic

strategies. Obviously, this paper has no discussion about President Ma's diplomatic truce in the framework of EU-China Relations.

Hickey, D. V. (2013). Wake up to reality: Taiwan, the Chinese mainland and peace across the taiwan strait. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 18(1), 1-20.

Hickey's article suggests that it will be difficult for the two sides to sustain the momentum in cross-strait relations unless Beijing--and to some extent Taipei--begin to recalibrate their relationship in a more pragmatic way and adopt some new thinking on the concepts of sovereignty and the political status of the ROC. This paper analyses that It is probable that the return to the "1992 consensus" is decisive turning point to make diplomatic truce optimistic between Beijing and Taipei. This is a tacit understanding whereby the two sides agreed to stop stealing each others diplomatic allies. (Hickey, 2013: 7). Nonetheless, this paper does not concern diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Liaw, B. C., K., Sasuga, K., & Huang, Y. (2012). Taiwan's economic diplomacy in Vietnam from the 1990s to the early twenty-first century. *East Asia : An International Quarterly*, 29(4), 355-376.

Liaw and Sasuga analyse Taiwan's economic diplomacy in Vietnam, and discusses Taiwanese and Vietnamese relationships and engagement. This article has no focus on diplomatic truce apparently.

Tai, W. (2012). Recent political developments in taiwan: Facing Beijing and Washington. *Perceptions*, 17(4), 79-103.

Tai's paper exams political interaction among China, U.S. and Taiwan, and this article has no analysis of diplomatic truce. However, this paper outlines that President Ma administration initiated the "diplomatic truce" to explore more international space for Taiwan. However, Beijing has never employed the same term. It is true that Beijing has since then exercised self-restraint by refraining from taking away diplomatic recognition from any country which recognises the Republic of China (essentially Taiwan) as the regime representing the entire Chinese territory. But other than that, Beijing still adopts a policy in restricting Taiwan's international space. (Tai, 2013: 92-93)

Cabestan, J. (2010). The new détente in the taiwan strait and its impact on taiwan's security and future. *China Perspectives*, (3), 22-33.

Cabestan concerns that China and Taiwan still exist potential armed conflict, even though both sides have deep economic integration. As regard to potentil armed conflict, China and Taiwan still have more or less confrontation in diplomacy. This paper argues

that President Ma proposes the diplomatic truce strategy to heat up Taiwan's international space, but avoids diplomatic confrontation. Even though diplomatic truce is not written in any document, China initiates several friendly proposals to appeal Taiwan into economic integration and co-operation, such like ECFA. This paper has no discussion about Taiwan diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Brown, D. G., & Scott, K. (2013). China-Taiwan relations: Relative calm in the Strait. *Comparative Connections*, 15(1), 75-85,

Brown and Scott analyse the Cross-Strait Relations development, and recognise President Ma's contribution of peaceful resolution in China-Taiwan sovereignty dispute, but criticise both sides to have slow and less progress in the Cross-Strait Relations. This article has no focus on diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Ding, Y. (2009). Beijing's new approach and the rapprochement in the taiwan strait. *Asian Affairs, an American Review*, 36(4), 179-199.

Ding analyses that China's new approach and rapprochement toward Taiwan independence, and this paper has no discussion about Taiwan diplomatic truce. Nevertheless, this paper's analysis outlines that in addition to broad agreements in the area of economic cooperation, Beijing also responded positively to Ma's call for a "diplomatic truce" by offering several concessions. Beijing allegedly turned down the offer made by the recently elected president of Paraguay to switch diplomatic relationships from Taipei to Beijing, for fear of disrupting the rapprochement with Taipei. (Ding, 2009: 188)

Muyard, F. (2010). Mid-term analysis of the ma ying-jeou administration. *China Perspectives*, (3), 5-21.

Muyard exams President Ma's administration, but discusses diplomatic truce a little. However, this article still analyses that in terms of Taiwan's international space, some progress has been made. As an extension of the understanding over a One China principle with Beijing, President Ma proposed a diplomatic truce and a policy of mutual non-denial, meaning that both sides should avoid negating the other's existence and refrain from poaching the other's diplomatic allies. Nonetheless, this paper has no discuss diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations. (Muyard, 2010: 8).

After literature review, this paper is designed to study what content of Taiwan's diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, and also analyses what reaction comes from in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

DIPLOMATIC TRUCE: NEW PRINCIPLE OF DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Why the Republic of China (Taiwan) seeks for diplomatic truce? What is diplomatic truce? Since Mr. Ma, Ying-jeou won presidential election in 2008, he has been active to improve relationship with China. Because of former President Chen, Shui-Bian's diplomatic strategy, China had less confidence toward Taiwan, and China was worried about Taiwan's diplomatic competition or Taiwan independence. Due to China-Taiwan in the diplomatic confrontation, China posed unfriendly toward Taiwan in diplomacy as well as the Cross-Strait affairs. When President Ma took oath, he prioritises the Cross-Strait affairs and diplomacy in order to better China-Taiwan relations.

President Ma addresses that Taiwan freezes diplomatic competition or confrontation against China, and proposes peaceful resolution to manage diplomacy and the Cross-Strait affairs. President Ma initiates the diplomatic truce to reconstruct mutual confidence between China and Taiwan. The diplomatic truce is oral and unilateral commitment, but China never responds negatively. Even though China has no comments or opinions on Taiwan's diplomatic truce in public, China endorses President Ma. According to Taiwan's parliament reports, President Ma's speech and diplomatic policy, and foreign minister's report and speech, the diplomatic truce refers to:

No dollar diplomacy. The diplomatic truce stops unreasonable foreign aid to appeal the third country to establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan or to persuade the third country to sever diplomatic relations with China.

One China Principle. The diplomatic truce recognises the 1992 Consensus that outlines "One China Principle but Self-interpretation", and President Ma reinforces One China Principle to make China feel safe and comfortable, and China decides to accept the Taiwan's diplomatic truce. (Powision-Neue Räume für Politik., 2009, Juni 2).

Co-existence and co-prosperity. The diplomatic truce is a means for Taiwan to seek co-existence and co-prosperity with China in the international diplomatic arena under the framework of a „modus vivendi“ diplomatic strategy. (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Sep 9)

No dual recognition. President Ma's proposal of a „diplomatic truce“ with China does not mean that the government is trying to work on a „dual recognition“ system. (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific. , 2008 Aug 17).

No diplomatic vacation. President Ma states that diplomatic truce is expected to strengthen current diplomatic ties, not to antagonize with Taiwan's allies. (Peter Stein, a. T.,

2008 Aug 08).

No diplomatic zero-sum game. Taiwan's diplomatic truce meant that both China and Taiwan compromised on the diplomatic front, kept their existing diplomatic allies, suspended „money diplomacy“, and maintained the status quo. (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Sep 12).

Taiwan Strait stability and global peace. Former Vice President Vincent Siew of Taiwan explained (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Aug 26), „President Ma Ying-jeou's pursuit of a „diplomatic truce“ with China will not only lead to lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait and global stability, but will also help to attract more investment to Taiwan and strengthen the country's move towards globalization“



Graphic 1 Countries that formally recognise Taiwan

Source: OxResearch Daily Brief Service. (2013). TAIWAN: Diplomatic truce yields tentative benefits. (2013). Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1399351810?accountid=15618>.

The diplomatic truce appeals China but not the opposite party in Taiwan. The opposite party criticises that the diplomatic truce collapses Taiwan's diplomacy. The opposite party fustigates the diplomatic truce:

The former chairwomen of the opposite party criticised (2008, Aug 9), „President Ma Ying-jeou's foreign policy advocacy of a „diplomatic truce“ with China, saying the idea is

tantamount to a „unilateral surrender of arms“ on Taiwan’s part. „

The opposite party lambasted that the diplomatic truce did not stop China’s diplomatic engagement toward Taiwan’s allies as well as did not explore more international space for Taiwan in international organisations. (Yan, 2009:8-9)

The opposite party mocks that the diplomatic truce is „surrender diplomacy“ and „shock diplomacy“(外交休克), because China has no response toward the diplomatic truce, and Taiwan unilaterally stops diplomatic engagement with other potential allies. Besides, the opposite party feels dissatisfied that diplomatic truce humiliates Taiwan’s allies, because they expect no future co-operation (中評社., 2009, July 6).

Gambia severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 15 Nov. 2013. The opposite party condemns diplomatic truce as a failure of President Ma’s diplomatic policy, because President Ma delivers friendly message to stop diplomatic contest against China, and also recognises One China Principle to satisfy China. Nonetheless, the diplomatic truce cannot keep Taiwan’s ally. (RFA, 2013 Nov 15)

Former Prime Minister analysed, „diplomatic truce might cease hostilities between Taiwan and China, but Gambia still severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Obviously, President Ma’s diplomatic strategy is full of problem.“ (Ettoday, 2013, Nov 18).

The opposite party analyses, diplomatic truce does not stop Taiwan’s allies to start economic and trade co-operation with China, and diplomatic truce may avoid diplomatic confrontation against China, but it cannot consolidate Taiwan allies. (顏建發, 2013:73-75).

VIABLE DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACH IN DIPLOMACY

Even though the diplomatic truce triggers critical argument, President Ma still maintains this diplomatic principle. Instead of the diplomatic truce, President Ma initiates „Viable Diplomacy“ approach to promote diplomatic truce. President Ma argues that the diplomatic truce cannot be understood or interpreted that Taiwan freezes any diplomatic engagement with current or potential allies, but Taiwan explores more international space actively in the condition of no-confrontation against China. President Ma demonstrates that the diplomatic truce appeals China’s trust and friendly response, and China offers more economic and trade co-operation with Taiwan as well as other countries.

President Ma explains that the diplomatic truce make China comfortable and other countries satisfying, and he refers to:

Bilateral trade agreements. Singapore and New Zealand has signed Free Trade

Agreements (FTAs) with Taiwan, and more countries plan to follow. (OXRESEARCH DAILY BRIEF SERVICE, 2013).

Effective participation in I.O.s (international organisations). President Ma addresses that the diplomatic truce make Taiwan's international space larger in international organisations, such like WHO, ASPA (Asian Science Park Association), IATA (International Air Transport Association), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).

China-Taiwan economic co-operation and integration. President Ma is optimistic about the Cross-Strait economic co-operation with diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy. Even though China has no active response toward President Ma's diplomatic strategy, China agrees to deepen and broaden mutual economic and trade co-operation to integrate Taiwan's economy. In final, China and Taiwan sign the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and the Trade in Service Agreement under the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy. (Schmidt, D, 2012:48-49)

By reason of negative stereotype of diplomatic truce, President Ma decides to promote the viable diplomacy to explore more co-operation with other countries and international organisations. President Ma outlines the viable diplomacy:

The viable diplomacy is diplomatic approach of diplomatic truce. President Ma argues that the diplomatic truce generates the viable diplomacy to explore more friendship with other countries. For example, former Panamanian counterpart President Martin Torrijos praised (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Aug 14) , President Ma Ying-jeou's proposal to seek a „diplomatic truce“ with China and his „modus vivendi“ strategy for Taiwan to obtain more international space.

The viable diplomacy is not dollar diplomacy but prosperity of liberty and democracy. President Ma believes that the viable diplomacy is not checkbook diplomatic approach, and the viable diplomacy can earn more respectiveness from Taiwan's allies.

The viable diplomacy refers to equal sovereignty, economic capacity, flexibility, and dignity. The viable diplomacy agrees to seek for official diplomatic relationship with any countries, and to protect national pride. The viable diplomacy explores more trade and economic opportunities and co-operation with other countries. The viable diplomacy agrees to use various titles to participate international organisations to explore more international space for Taiwan.

The viable diplomacy paves the way to 3-win strategy. President Ma explains that the viable diplomacy connects with the diplomatic truce, and this combination can release China's

anxiety in sovereignty, and it also benefits Taiwan's allies, and it favours the international community as well.

The viable diplomacy is public diplomacy and soft power. President Ma introduces that there are many NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) in Taiwan, and Taiwan government co-operate with them to explore international space, and the viable diplomacy uses soft power to consolidate Taiwan's allies as well as to influence other countries.

The viable diplomacy makes Taiwan enjoy more visa-free status. President Ma demonstrates that the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy make China and other countries comfortable, and many countries expect peaceful interaction and resolution between China and Taiwan. The viable diplomacy makes Taiwan trustable for China and other countries, and this is the major reason why many countries grant Taiwan visa-free status.

Apparently, the viable diplomacy cannot stop Gambia to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but it actually discovers more international space for Taiwan.

NEW PRINCIPLE AND APPROACH IN THE EU-CHINA RELATIONS

This paper agrees that diplomacy seeks for national interest, and diplomatic is relative, particularly diplomacy surrounding with hostility. Even though China and Taiwan maintain friendly interaction under President Ma's administration, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy cannot erase sovereignty dispute between China and Taiwan, particularly diplomacy connects with sovereignty. Realists conclude that interest seeking is power, and realism explains how country to gain power. This paper applies the Historical Review to review President Ma's diplomatic strategy, and uses Realism to analyse diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy in the EU-China Relations.

President Ma outlines diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy in 2008, and he plans to abandon „checkbook diplomacy“ on the purpose of no diplomatic zero-sum competition between China and Taiwan. The diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy seek for harmony of interest, and President Ma expects China and other countries to provide more opportunity and co-operation with Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan is granted more international space in diplomacy until now, but diplomacy is connected with sovereignty. Even though diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy relate to One China doctrine, China is still cautious and suspicious about Taiwan sovereignty and diplomacy.

After literature review, few papers relate to President Ma's diplomatic strategy in the framework of the EU-China Relations. Nonetheless, the EU and China discuss about

Taiwan issue on the EU-China Summit. From the 4th to 12th EU-China Summit, the EU and China have exchanged and discussed about Taiwan issue:

“the EU side reaffirmed that it would continue to adhere to the one China principle and hoped for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China principle and reiterated its principled position on the settlement of the Taiwan question in accordance with the basic principle of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”.” (EU, 2001: 2).

“The EU side reaffirmed that it would continue to adhere to the one China principle and hoped for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The EU side took note of recent developments across the Taiwan Straits, as briefed by the Chinese side. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China principle and reiterated its principled position on the settlement of the Taiwan question in accordance with the basic principle of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”.” (EU, 2002:2)

“The EU side reaffirmed that it continues to adhere to the one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the settlement of the Taiwan question in accordance with the basic principle of „peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”.” (EU, 2003:3)

“The EU side reaffirmed its continued adherence to the one China policy, and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the Taiwan question.” (EU, 2004:3)

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“The EU reaffirmed its commitment to one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The EU reiterated its concern over the intended referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan as this

could lead to a unilateral change of the status quo across Taiwan straits to which the EU is opposed. In this context, the EU expressed its concern over the Taipei authorities' intentions about the future status of the island." (EU, 2007:4)

"The EU reaffirmed its commitment to one China policy and supported peaceful development in the relations across the Taiwan Straits. (EU, 2009:3)"

After the 13th the EU-China Summit, the Taiwan issue has not been on the agenda anymore until now. Former President Chen's administration started from 2000 to 2008, and the EU and China agree to support One China Policy, One Country Two System, Peaceful Resolution, and Denial of UN membership on Taiwan issue. President Ma's administration begins from 2008 to 2016, and the EU and China agree to One China Policy, and support peaceful development between China and Taiwan. Obviously, China expects to have more cooperation with Taiwan, and also has positive response toward the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy that avoid disputable sovereignty issue.

Table 1 EU-China's position on Taiwan issue from 2000-2016

| President Chen 2000-2008, Republic of China (Taiwan) | | President Ma 2008-2016, Republic of China (Taiwan) | |
|--|--|--|--|
| EU-China's position on Taiwan issue | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One China Policy • One Country Two System • Peaceful Resolution • Denial of the UN membership on Taiwan issue | EU-China's position on Taiwan issue | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One China Policy • Peaceful development |

Consequently, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy result in peaceful development between China and Taiwan, and the EU welcomes the Cross-Strait peaceful dialogue. Nevertheless, Taiwan is on the horns of dilemma—relative interest and harmony of interest. Realism analyses interaction and relation of power and interest. According to Realism, Taiwan loses potential opportunity to access the UN membership, and its sovereignty may be violated, but diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy bring harmony of interest for China and Taiwan. On the opposite site, Taiwan drops diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, and Taiwan can maintains relative

interest.

Taiwan seeking the UN membership violates China's One China Policy, because China justifies its sovereignty, and Taiwan cannot be separated from One China sovereignty. On sovereignty issue, Taiwan and China are in trouble of zero-sum game, but as regard to trade and economic co-operation Taiwan and China achieve harmony of interest. The EU would not detail the course of Cross-Strait relations based on the 1992 Consensus, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy. The EU expects and welcomes peaceful development and constructive dialogue between China and Taiwan, and explores more trade and economic opportunities with China and Taiwan. The diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy make the EU comfortable in the Cross-Strait relation, because the EU just aims on trade and economic co-operation with China and Taiwan, and is not enforced to get involved into the Cross-Strait sovereignty issue.

CONCLUSION

This paper concludes that diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy contribute peaceful resolution and development for the Cross-Strait relations, and President Ma's diplomatic strategy satisfies China. No doubt, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy generates more international space and economic-trade co-operation with China as well as other countries. However, this research argues that diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy sacrifice Taiwan's UN membership application. In addition, diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy help China legitimate and justify One China Policy, and Taiwan problem is unsolved China's sovereignty problem.

This article analyses that China persuades the EU to reaffirm its position in the Cross-Strait sovereignty issue, and requests the EU to support China to promote One Country Two System in Taiwan issue. Besides, China succeeds to stop the EU member states to support Taiwan's application of the UN membership, and reinforces the EU to reaffirm One China Policy.

This research concludes several research findings: 1. diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy explores more international space for Taiwan in organisations, and more and more countries support President Ma's diplomatic strategy. Many countries believe that the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy provide peaceful resolution to the Cross-Strait sovereignty issue. 2. diplomatic and viable diplomacy release political pressure for China's and

Taiwan's allies, and they can exchange co-operation opportunity. These allies do not have to choose side to stand. 3. the diplomatic truce and viable can be agreeable between China and Taiwan by reason of One China Policy. If one party does not recognise One China principle, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy cannot function. 4. The EU is an influential actor in international politics, and the EU welcomes the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, because the member states can get rid of the Cross-Strait diplomatic competition. 5. China reinforces the EU reaffirms its position on Taiwan issue during the EU-China Summit very often, and China plans to make Taiwan issue be strategic and variable to affect the EU-China relations.

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